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THE AFTERMATH OF WILLIAMS v. NORTH
CAROLINA'
ERNEST G. LORENZEN"

T HERE

is no topic in the conflict of laws so full of
legal difficulties today as the migratory divorce problem. Williams v. North Carolina I and II have not found
a solution to this problem, but still insist for the recognition of interstate divorce upon the acquisition of a bona
fide domicil.
Public opinion in America has always been greatly
divided on the social desirability of "easy" divorces. Early
in the 19th century there was a great deal of complaint
in Massachusetts concerning the "easy" Vermont divorces.
Massachusetts did not allow divorce at that time for extreme cruelty, whereas Vermont did. Furthermore Vermont permitted divorce without any settled domicil.
Judge Sewell of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, referring to the lax Vermont laws of his time,
said: "The operation of this assumed and extraordinary
jurisdiction is an annoyance to the neighboring states,
injurious to the morals and habits of their people; and
* An address given before the Legal Clinic of the Dade County Bar
Association on December 17, 1946.
** Professor of Law, Univ. of Miami, Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale
School of Law, Ph.B., Cornell University, 1898; LL.B. Cornell University, 1899; .cole ae Droit, Tcole Libre des Sciences Politiques, Paris;
University of Heidelberg; J.U.D., maxima cun laude, Gottingen, 1901;
Hon. M.A. Yale, 1917.
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the existence of it is, for this reason, to be reprobated
in the strongest terms, and to be counteracted by legislative provisions in the offended states."'
Fifty years later Chief Justice Redfield complained of
the lax divorce legislation of Rhode Island, Maine, and
Indiana. In an article concerning the early cases in support of the status theory of divorce, he said: "And these
decisions have all come from states which have acquired
an unenviable notoriety in regard to their lax views upon
the law of divorce.'"
The two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Williams v. North Carolina' have again raised
the legal difficulties presented by the migratory divorce.
These decisions appear to rest upon the status theory of
divorce and appear to hold that if the defendant has been
brought before the court constructively, the validity of
the divorce depends upon whether or not the plaintiff acquired a bona fide domicil in the state.
STATUS v. CONTRACT OR PENAL THEORY -

NEW YORK

The interstate divorce problem has been judicially considered far more frequently in New York than in any
other American jurisdiction. The development of this field
of law in New York is valuable background for lawyers
everywhere who must consider the interstate validity of
divorces.
The New York courts have up to the present time declined to accept the status theory of divorce in all of its
logical implications.' Early in the 19th century the New
York courts required jurisdiction over the parties and
over the subject-matter. By subject-matter they seem
to have meant either that the marriage was celebrated in
New York or that the tort was committed while the parties
were domiciled in that state. The first is known as the
contract theory, and the latter as the penal theory re* Barber V. Root, 10 Mass. 260, 265 (1813).
3 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 193, 217 (1864).
3
317
U. S. 287 (1942), and 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
* For fuller discussion see Howe, Recognition of Foreign Divorce
Decrees in New York State (1940) 40 Col. L.. Rev. 373.
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garding divorce. In 1816, for instance, Judge Platt stated
that a divorce granted in the state in which the marriage
was celebrated might be entitled to recognition.' That is
the contract theory of divorce. As late as 1871, Judge
Parker still held to the penal theory. Suit for divorce
was brought in New York by the husband. The
answer was that he had established a residence in Iowa
and obtained a divorce there on the ground of cruel and
inhuman treatment, the wife having been served constructively oniy. The husband demurred to the answer
and the demurrer was sustained. Judge Parker said: "On
no principle can the courts of Iowa have had jurisdiction
of the subject-matter of the suit in this case. The act
which was the cause of the action being no wrong to the
plaintiff when committed, both parties being domiciled
in this state, clearly, while the plaintiff remained in this
state, the courts of Iowa had no jurisdiction of it. Jurisdiction was not given to such courts of such subjectmatter by the subsequent removal of the parties to that
state."'
By 1878, however, a new conception of what constituted the subject-matter of divorce jurisdiction had arisen
in New York. In that year, Judge Folger remarked: "When
the statutes of a state have conferred upon any of its
courts the power to act judicially upon the matrimonial
status of its citizens, or of persons within its territorial
limits, and to adjudge a dissolution of the relation of
husband and wife; then, we take it, such court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of divorce ....

Power given

by law to a court, to adjudge divorces from the ties of
matrimony, does give jurisdiction of the subject-matter
of divorce."' Apparently a court was deemed to have
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of divorce if it had
been given the power to deal with that question by the
legislature. The problem was then only whether the dePawlin v. Bird's Executors, 13 Johns. 192 (N. Y. 1816).
Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Lans. 388, 389 (W. Y. 1871).
Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 228 (1878). See also Kinnier v. Kinnier,
45 N.Y. 535 (1871).
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fendant had been brought before the court in a proper
manner.
The status theory of divorce was advocated in other
New York cases, due largely to the influence of the Rhode
Island leading case of Ditson v. Ditson favoring that
view.' The status theory, however, was never accepted
in New York to the full extent suggested in the Ditson
case.
The legislative history in New York regarding local
jurisdiction for divorce tells the same story. The New
York courts have never had jurisdiction for divorce and
do not possess it now solely on the ground that both
parties are domiciled in the state at the time the suit
is brought. The New York statutes confer jurisdiction
only:
1. Where both parties were residents of the state
when the offense was committed.
2. Where the parties were married within the state.
3. Where the plaintiff was a resident of the state
when the offence was committed and is a resident thereof
when the action is commenced.
4. Where the offence was committed within the state
and the injured party is a resident of the state when the
action is commenced."
From the beginning, the New York courts have never
had jurisdiction solely on the basis of the status theory of
divorce. Either the adultery must have been committed
in New York (and the plaintiff be a resident at the time
of suit), or the parties must be domiciled in New York
at the time of the adultery, or the marriage must have
been celebrated in New York, or the plaintiff must have
been a resident of New York both at the time of the
offence and the suit.
Prior to Williams v. North Carolina, the modern New
York decisions presented two characteristic trends. First,
they have continued to insist upon the necessity of per* 4 R.I. 87 (1856).
* See Greene, The
(1926) 11 Corn. L.Q.
- New York Civil

Discussed infra.
Enforcement of a Foreign Divorce in New York
141.
Practice Act, Section 1147.
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sonal jurisdiction over the defendant. In their latest
decisions this rule is applied only to New York defendants.
Where the defendant has his or her domicil in some other
state, the New York courts will refer to the decisions of
that state. If the divorce is recognized in that state without personal service over the defendant, the New York
courts will recognize it. If they do not, the New York
courts will not do so." The other peculiarity is that according to a number of decisions the New York courts
will not inquire whether a bona fide domicil has been
acquired in the state granting a divorce, provided the
defendant appeared in the proceedings." These cases are
.opposed, of course, to the status theory of divorce.
THE STATUS THEORY

In 1841, Story, the. great authority on the conflict of
laws, wrote: "The doctrine now firmly established in
America upon the subject of divorce is that the law of
the place of the actual bona fide domicil of the parties
gives jurisdiction to the proper courts, to decree a divorce
for any cause allowed by the local law, without any reference to the law of the place of the original marriage,
or the place where the offence for which the divorce is
allowed was committed.""
This certainly looks like the status theory as it is conceived today, but apparently it was not so understood by
courts or writers at the time and later. In editing the sixth
edition of Story, Chief Justice Redfield stated that the
accepted rule of jurisdiction "must receive this qualification that it be not extended beyond transactions occurring
while the parties had a fixed and permanent domicil
within the forum." Judge Parker of New York pointed
out that Story did not mean to suggest that "the cause
of action can be transferred from one jurisdiction to an" Ball v. Cross. 231 N.Y, 329 (1921), Dean v. Dean, 241 N.Y. 240
(1925).
" Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14 (1923); Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296
(1938); Ansorge v. Armour, 267 N.Y. 492 (1935); Guggenheim v. Wahl,
203 N.Y. 390 (1911); Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N.Y. 535 (1871): Tiedemann
v. Tiedemann, 158 N.Y. Supp. 851 (1916).
Story, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed. 1841) Section 230a.
Story, Conflict of Laws (6th ed. by Redfield, 1865) Section 230a.
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other; but it is, as therein stated, the law of the place
of the actual domicil of the parties which gives jurisdiction; and the jurisdiction of the subject-matter, must,
of course, exist at the time of the commission of the of-'
fense which constitutes the cause of action, or not at all.
The law of the place of domicil at the time of the commission of the offense, though committed in another place,
will control."'
Of all the early decisions, Ditson v. Ditson," decided
in 1856, sets forth the status theory of divorce in the most
explicit manner. A female citizen of Rhode Island had
been married in New York to an Englishman. They
lived for several years abroad, and she was finally deserted
by him in Massachusetts, where they were domiciled at
the time. The wife thereupon returned to her father's
house in Rhode Island. After residing in Rhode Island
for three years she brought suit for divorce there. Regarding the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island courts Chief
Justice Ames said: "It is a well-settled principle of general law upon this subject, that the tribunals of a country
have no jurisdiction over a cause of divorce, wherever
the offense may have occurred, if neither of the parties
has a bona fide domicil within its territory; and this
holds, whether one or both of the parties be temporarily
residing within reach of the process of the court, or
whether the defendant appears or not, and submits to
the suit. This necessarily results from the right of every
nation or state to determine the status of its own domiciled
citizens or subjects, without interference by foreign
tribunals in a matter with which they have no concern.""
"

Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Lans. 388, 390 (N.Y. 1871).

4 R.I. 87 (1856).
Id. at 93. Further at page 106, Chief Justice Ames says, "It is
obvious, that marriage, as a domestic relation (emerged from the contract which created it) is known and recognized as such throughout the
civilized world; that it gives rights, and imposes duties and restrictions
upon the parties to it,affecting their social and moral condition, of the
measure of which every civilized state, and certainly every state of this
Union, is the sole judge so far as its own citizens or subjects are concerned, and should be so deemed by other civilized, and especially sister
states that a state cannot be deprived, directly or indirectly, of its soy-
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In 1877 the Supreme Court of the United States decided the famous case of Pennoyer v. Neff," in which it
laid down the fundamental distinction between actions in
personam and actions in rem. Courts accepting the reasoning of Chief Justice Ames in Ditson v. Ditson thereafter
classified divorce proceedings as actions in rem which
would justify the use of constructive service with respect
to the absent defendant.
Toward the middle of the last century, if not before,
a married woman who was justified in living apart from
her husband because of his fault, was permitted to acquire
a separate domicil for purposes of divorce and to bring
her husband before the court by constructive service.'"
Before long it was recognized that whenever husband and
wife had separate domicils, the marriage status, i.e. the
res or subject-matter of the divorce action, was at the
domicil of either spouse, so as to give jurisdiction to
both states to grant a valid divorce upon constructive
service.
ereign power to regulate the status of its own domiciled subjects and
citizens, by the fact that the subjects and citizens, of other states, as
related to them, are interested in that status, and in such a .matter has
a right, under the general law, judicially to deal with and modify or
dissolve this relation, binding both parties to it by the decree, by virtue
of its inherent power over its own citizens and subjects, and to enable
it to answer their obligatory demands for justice; and finally, that in the
exercise of this judicial power . . . the general law does not deprive a
state of its proper jurisdiction over the condition of its own citizens.
because non-residents, foreigners, or domiciled inhabitants of other
states have not or will not become, and cannot be made to become, personally subject to the jurisdiction of its courts; but upon the most familiar principles, and as illustrated by the most familiar analogies of
general law, its courts may and can act conclusively in such a matter
upon the rights and interests of such persons, giving to them such notice,
actual or constructive, as the nature of the case admits, and the practice
of the courts in similar cases sanctions."
' 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
" Mr. Justice Swayne makes this broad statement in Cheever v.
Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 19 L.Ed. 604, 608 (1869): "The rule is that she
may acquire a separate domicil whenever it is necessary or proper that
she should do so. The right springs from the necessity for its exercise,
and endures as long as the necessity continues."
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Professor Minor," of the University of Virginia, summarizing the state of the law in his text-book on the confliet of laws, which appeared in 1901, divides the cases
into three classes. Most courts had accepted by that time'
the status theory of divorce so forcefully expounded by
Chief Justice Ames in Ditson v. Ditson, and called by
Professor Minor the in rem theory. A few states at that
time would recognize a foreign divorce rendered in the
state of the plaintiff's bona fide domicil only if the
defendant received actual notice of the pendency of the
action in time to be able to defend the suit. Professor
Minor calls this the quasi-in-rem theory. The third theory
he calls the in personam theory, referring to the attitude
of the New York courts. By the in personam theory
Professor Minor did not mean what is usually meant by
that phrase, namely, that jurisdiction over the parties is
sufficient, but that the foreign divorce would not be
recognized, even if the plaintiff had acquired a bona fide
domicil in the state of the divorce, unless the defendant
was personally before the court. We have seen above
that the New York courts have adhered to this rule with
respect to New York defendants.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

Such W¢as the general state of affairs in 1901, when
Professor Minor wrote. In the same year, the question of
the application of the full faith and credit clause to divorce decrees rendered by courts of sister states came
for the first time before the Supreme Court of the United
States. In Bell v. Bell2 ' the parties were domiciled in
New York. The husband obtained a divorce in Pennsylvania on constructive service. The law of Pennsylvania
required that the plaintiff be a bona fide resident of the
state. The referee having found that the husband had
not acquired a bona fide domicil in Pennsylvania, the
Supreme Court held that the decree was not entitled to
full faith and credit. Mr. Justice Gray said: "No valid
divorce can be decreed on constructive service by the courts
of a state in which neither party is domiciled."
, Minor, Conflict of Laws (1901).
" 181 U.S. 175 (1901),

19471
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In Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, decided by the Supreme
Court at the same time as Bell v. Bell, the parties were
domiciled in New Jersey. The husband obtained a divorce
in North Dakota, the law of which required a domicil in
good faith for ninety days as a prerequisite for jurisdiction for divorce. The husband not having obtained a
bona fide domicil, the Supreme Court held on the basis of
Bell v. Bell that New Jersey need not recognize the North
Dakota decree. Atherton v. Atherton," decided in the
same year, held that where the divorce was obtained at
the matrimonial domicil upon constructive service, it must
be recognized elsewhere.
In Andrews v. Andrews," which came before the
Supreme Court in 1903, the parties had their domicil
in Massachusetts. The husband went to South Dakota
for the purpose of getting a divorce and the wife consented to the granting of the decree. The courts of Massachusetts declined to recognize the decree and the Supreme
Court held that they were justified in their attitude, in
view of the fact that neither party was domiciled in South
Dakota.
In 1906 the Supreme Court decided the famous case
of Haddock v. Haddock." The parties were domiciled in
New York. The husband abandoned his wife and established a bona fide domicil in Connecticut, where he obtained a divorce on constructive service. The New York
courts declined to recognize the divorce because the New
York defendant was not personally before the Connecticut court. The Supreme Court held that the New York
courts were under no constitutional duty to recognize
the divorce with respect to the New York defendant,"
" 181 U.S. 177 (1901).
" 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
" 188 U.S. 14 (1903).
" 201 U.S. 525 (1906),
* This decision met with a great deal of disapproval. See Beale,
ConstitutionalProtection of Decrees for Divorce (1906). 19 Harv. L. Rev.
586. In 1926 Professor Beale wrote another article on the subject,
Haddock Revisited, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417. This article was written in
support of Professor Beale's new theory on interstate recognition of
divorce which was accepted by the American Law Institute. This theory
was incorporated in Section 113: "A state can exercise through its courts
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although it was admitted that Connecticut had jurisdiction over the status of the husband so as to be able to

grant him a valid divorce, at least a divorce valid in
Connecticut.
No other case came before the Supreme Court until
1938, when in Davis v. Davis" the Supreme Court held
that the parties litigating the issue of domicil were precluded on grounds of res judicata from raising the ques-

tion again in another suit."
jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of spouses of whom one is domiciled
within the state and the other is domiciled outside the state if
a. the spouse who is not domiciled in the state
(i) has consented that the other spouse acquire a separate home; or
(ii) by his or her misconduct has ceased to have the right to object
to the acquisition of such separate home; . . ." Restatemnent of
The Law of Conflict of Laws (1934) Section 113.
Under this new theory "fault" becomes a jurisdictional fact in connection with the recognition of foreign divorce, and much objection has been
raised against the theory. See Bingham, The American Law Institute v.
The Supreme Court - in the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock (1936) 21
Corn. L.Q. 393; McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction
(1928) 37 Yale L.J. 564. As the Haddock case was overruled in Williams
v. North Carolina I, the theory underlining the Restatement has ceased
to be of practical importance.
305 U.S. 32 (1938).
This was one of the earlier cases in 'which the Supreme Court
extended the bounds of res adjudicata to the subject-matter of a suit.
See also Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). In an
earlier decision it had applied res adjudicata. to jurisdiction over the
person. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Association, 283
U.S. 522 (1931). See also Restatement of the Law of Judgments, American Law Institute (1942) Section 10, which reads:
"(1) Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and determines
that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot
collaterally attack the judgment on the ground that the court did not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter, unless the policy underlying
the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed by the policy against permitting a court to act beyond its jurisdiction. (2) Among the factors
appropriate to be considered in determining that collateral attack should
be permitted are that
(a) the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was clear;
(b) the determination as to jurisdiction depended upon a question of
law rather than of fact;
(c) the court was one of limited and not of general jurisdiction;
(d) the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated:

1947]
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In 1942 the case of Williams v. North Carolina 1P
raised once more the status of migratory divorce decrees
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause." In that case
both Williams and Mrs. Hendrix had been married and
domiciled for many years in North Carolina. They went
to Nevada for purposes of divorce, which they obtained
after six weeks residence. They thereupon married in
Nevada and returned immediately to North Carolina,
where they were indicted for bigamous cohabitation. Relying on the decision of the Haddock case, the state did
not challenge the acquisition of a bona fide domicil by
the defendants in Nevada, but tried the case on the theory
that North Carolina did not have to recognize the Nevada
decree because the defendants in the Nevada proceedings
had been served only constructively. In the Haddock case
it had been decided, as we have seen, that New York did
not have to recognize the Connecticut decree with respect
to the New York spouse, because of the lack of personal
jurisdiction, although it was conceded that the husband
had acquired a bona fide domicil in Connecticut. The
parties were convicted, and upon appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States this conviction was reversed,
the Haddock case being expressly overruled.
The State of North Carolina did not rest at that point,
but tried the parties again, this time challenging the acquisition of a bona fide domicil in Nevada. It having
been found that such a domicil had not been acquired,
the parties were again convicted. Once more the cases
were carried to the Supreme Court, which sustained the
convictions, holding that the courts of North Carolina
could inquire into the bona fide character of the Nevada
fe)

the policy against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction is
strong."
317 U.S. 287 (1942).
"
See Lorenzen, Haddock v. Haddock Overruled (1943), 52 Yale L.J.
341; Strahorn and Reiblich, The Haddock Case Overruled - The Future
of Interstate Divorce (1942), 7 Md. L. Rev. 29; Barnhard, Haddock
of the Divisible Divorce (1943), 31 Geo. L.J. 210;
Reversed -Harbinger
Taintor, is Haddock Dead? (1943), 15 Miss. L.J. 165,
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domicil and could decline to recognize the divorces in
case no such domicil had been established."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority
of the court said: "Under our system of law, judicial
power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speakingis founded on domicil. .

. The framers of the Constitu-

tion were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite,
and since 1789 neither this Court nor any other court in
the English-speaking world has questioned it. Domicil
implies a nexus between person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and
responsibilities of the utmost significance. The domicil
of one spouse within a State gives power to that State,
we have held, to dissolve a marriage wheresoever contracted. .

.

. Divorce, like marriage, is of concern not

merely to the immediate parties. It affects personal rights
of the deepest significance. It also touches basic interests
of society. Since divorce, like marriage, creates a new
status, every consideration of policy makes it desirablethat the effect should be the same wherever the question
arises.""
Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote a dissenting opinion and
so did Mr. Justice Black, in whose opinion Mr. Justice
Douglas joined.
Mr. Justice Rutledge contended that the test of
domicil was not contained in the Constitution of the
United States but constituted a judicial importation which
"has outlived its jurisdictional usefulness unless caprice,
confusion and contradiction are desirable criteria of jurisdictional conceptions." Since, in the estimation of Mr.
Justice Rutledge, according to the majority of the court
the divorce decrees were valid in Nevada, he contends that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause demanded that they be
recognized as valid everywhere. If full faith and credit
were not to be given to the Nevada decrees, argues Mr.
v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See Lorenzen,
si Williams
ExtraterritorialDivorce - Williams v. North CarolinaII (1945), 54 Yale
L.J. 799; and Powell, And R6pent at Leisure (1945), 58 Harv. L.
Rev. 930.
82 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
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Justice Rutledge, the constitutional policy should at least
be approximated by not allowing other states to deny them
full faith and credit "by any standard of proof which is
less than generally required to overturn or disregard a
judgment upon direct attack.""
Mr. Justice Black assumed that in the opinion of the
majority, the Nevada decrees, without bona fide domicil
in the state, were invalid in Nevada, and he objected to
the introduction of the test of domicil as a prerequisite
to the validity of divorce under the Due Process Clause
as an unwarranted expansion of federal power.
In the case of Esenwein v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," decided at the same time as Williams v. North
Carolina II, the-dissenting justices in the latter case agreed
with the majority on the ground that a distinction existed
between the cases in which the marital capacity of the
divorced persons was challenged, which might lead to
criminal convictions and the bastardization of children,
and cases of marital support, which do not necessarily
raise irreconcilable conflicts between the policies of two
states. In the Esenwein case, the wife had obtained an
order for support in Pennsylvania. The husband later
obtained a divorce in Nevada and thereupon filed a petition in Pennsylvania for total relief from the support
order. The application was denied on the ground that
he had not acquired a bona fide domicil in Nevada. The
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court unanimously.
As long as the Supreme Court adheres to the views
expressed in the two cases of Williams v. North Carolina,"
it would seem that whenever Nevada divorces are obtained upon constructive service the other states are not
bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize
those decrees if neither spouse had a bona fide domicil
in Nevada, and that any finding of domicil by the divorce court may be challenged by evidence showing that
the plaintiff in the divorce suit had no intention to establish a bona fide domicil in the state, in the sense of
at 244.
325 U.S. 279 (1946).
317 U.S. 287 (1942) and 325 U.S. 226 (1945),

14.
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intending to make it his or her permanent home, or at
least, his or her home for an indefinite period of time."
It will be observed that the Supreme Court in the two
Williams cases adopts the status theory of divorce set
forth in Ditson v. Ditson ninety years ago."
If this position leads to most undesirable results,
namely, the invalidation of many divorces and the possible
bastardization of children, it may be asked what alterna-

tives were open to the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Rutledge suggests that the Supreme Court should abandon
the requirement of domicil altogether, or at least allow
it to be challenged only by a standard of proof required
for a direct attack. If the latter course were adopted it
would be very difficult indeed to challenge the Nevada
"6 This test of domicil is the one universally adopted in this country.
See Dupuy v. Wurtz, 55 N.Y. 556 (1873). It might be called "domicil" in
the international sense as contrasted with domicil in the local sense. In
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), the Supreme Court drew a
similar distinction between a "penal" law in the conflict of laws sense
(for purposes of the enforcement of judgments of sister states and foreign countries) and "penal" law for local purposes. It was there stated
that "the question whether a statute of one state which in some aspects
may be called penal, is a penal law, in the international sense, so that
it cannot be enforced in the courts of another state, depends upon the
question whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the public
justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by
the wrongful act. .. ."
For local purposes "domicil" may be defined by a state as requiring
something less than for conflict of laws purposes. In connection with
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Supreme Court naturally and
correctly applied the traditional conflict of laws concept of domicil.
" Where the defendant appears and challenges the acquisition of the
domicil by the plaintiff, he will be precluded from questioning it again
in a subsequent proceeding. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938). In New
York and elsewhere, persons who have invoked the jurisdiction of the
divorce court, cannot later set up the defense that the court had no
jurisdiction. See Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, Section
112 (estoppel to deny jurisdiction) ; Jacobs, Attack upon Divorce Decrees
(1936), 34 Mich. L. Rev. 749, 959; Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce
(1935), 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 335; Harper, The Validity of Void
Divorces (1930), 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 158; Derby, Obligation of Invalid
Divorce on Person Who Induced It and Married Party Procuring It
(1934), 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 31; 9 Geo. L.J. 106 (1940); 54 Harv. L. Rev.
1060 (1941). Compare Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903).

1947]

194MIAMI LAI

QUdRTERLY

divorce, and for all practical purposes it would validate
the migratory divorce. And what is the objection to such
a change of attitude _by the Supreme Court? The objection is that it fails to consider the rights of defendants
and of the state in which they are domiciled.
Take the Williams cases. Here the parties had their
domicils for many years in North Carolina. Williams and
Mrs. Hendrix go to Nevada and remain there only six
weeks. Mrs. Williams No. 1 and Hendrix continue to
reside in North Carolina. The question presented is one
of balancing the rights of Nevada against thbse of North
Carolina and the rights of the respective spouses. North
Carolina has a deep interest in its citizens and their status
and Nevada has a like interest in its citizens and their
status. After all, the character of a state is determined
by the people domiciled therein and not by those who are
merely temporary residents. The Supreme Court under
the Constitution is the final arbiter of these conflicting
claims. If it holds that Nevada has the power to divorce
the parties in the Williams cases, it means that Nevada
has not only the power to undermine the divorce legislation of North Carolina, but that it has the power also
to compel the other spouses that remained in North Carolina to litigate their marital relations in Nevada when
they are unwilling to submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts and the divorce policies of that state. Is it fair
to hold that they may be brought before the courts of
Nevada by constructive service when they are unwilling
to submit to the lax divorce laws of Nevada? If this
were an action on a contract, this could not be done without violating the Due Process Clause. Why should it be
allowed in a suit for divorce where the plaintiffs have
been in the state only six weeks and intend to return to
North Carolina immediately? If constructive service were
allowed under such circumstances could it not be contended tha t it would be valid likewise if Nevada reduced
the residence requirement to a single week or a single
day? It is extremely difficult, therefore, to accept the
suggestion of Mr. Justice Rutledge.
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Let us see now where Mr. Justice Black's suggestion
leads to. He puts forth the argument that under the Act
of Congress the judgments and decrees of sister states
are entitled to the same faith and credit as they have by
law or usage in the state where they have been rendered,
and that a divorce which is valid in Nevada is therefore
valid everywhere. The question thus becomes whether the
Nevada divorces are valid in Nevada. Mr. Justice Jackson
in his dissenting opinion in Williams v. North Carolina I
admits that the Nevada divorces without bona fide domicil
may be valid in Nevada for some limited purposes, but
not beyond. He says: "To hold that the Nevada judgments were not binding in North Carolina because they
were rendered without jurisdiction over the North Carolina spouses, it is not necessary to hold that they were
without any conceivable validity. It may be, and probably
is, true that Nevada has sufficient interest in the lives
of those who sojourn there to free them and their spouses
to take new spouses without incurring criminal penalties
under Nevada law. I know of nothing in our Constitution
that requires Nevada to adhere to the traditional concepts of bigamous unions or the legitimacy of the fruit
thereof.. And the control of a state over property within
its borders is so complete that I suppose that Nevada
could effectively deal with it in the name of divorce as
completely as in any other. But it is quite a different
thing to say that Nevada can dissolve the marriages of
North Carolinians and dictate the incidence of the bigamy
statutes of North Carolina by which North Carolina has
sought to protect her own interests as well as theirs. In
this case there is no conceivable basis of jurisdiction in
the Nevada court over the absent spouses, and, a fortiori,
over North Carolina herself."'" The ultimate question is
whether Nevada shall be regarded as having the constitutional power to divorce anybody actually within the
state, even upon constructive service, without any requirement of domicil or residence? If the answer is in
the affirmative, why require any physical presence? Why
could not the divorce legislation be carried as far as in
" 317 U.S. 287, 319 (1942).
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some parts of Mexico, where jurisdiction will be taken
upon the basis of mere consent? We would then be in a
position to recognize divorce by mail.
It is apparent from the above that it is extremely difficult to recognize the migratory divorce in the absence
of a substantial period of residence. It must be admitted
that under modern conditions the test of domicil is
frequently most unsatisfactory," but in Anglo-American
law many rights are determined on that basis. We have
been unable to find a better criterion. In the conflict of
laws domicil governs many rights in the law of familyfor example, legitimacy, legitimation and adoption. Can
we dispense with it in the law of divorce? The migratory
divorce problem cannot be solved on the theory that the
proceeding is one in personam," for that theory would not
take care of divorces where the defendant does not appear. The defendant could not be served constructively
without violating the Due Process Clause. Residence
might be substituted for domicil, but the question would
be how long should that residence be in order to make it
seem fair to have the defendant brought in constructively.
I suggested in an article that six months might be
enough;- other students of the conflict of laws feel that
one year should be a minimum.
. If the defendant appears, the Supreme Court might
follow the New York law and recognize the foreign divorce without regard to the existence of a bona fide
domicil. It would be difficult to reconcile this with any
consistent theory concerning the nature of a divorce proceeding and it would not solve the migratory divorce
problem where the defendant does not agree to the divorce, and therefore declines to appear.
" As the establishment of domicil depends upon a person's intention
to make it his home for an indefinite period of time, it is often difficult
to know where a person is actually domiciled. See In re Dorrance's
Estate, 170 Atl. 601 (1934).
0 In support of the in personam theory, see Ashley, Conflict of Laws
Upon the Subject of Marriage and Divorce (1906), 15 Yale L.J. 387.
11 Lorenzen, Haddock v. Haddock Overruled (1943), 52 Yale L.J.
341, 352.
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What is the solution of this divorce problem? A
sensible way out would be an Act of Congress indicating
the terms under which divorce decrees of sister states
shall be recognized. If it said that a residence of six
weeks is sufficient our troubles with the Nevada divorces
would be over. Unfortunately for the migratory divorce,
Congress is not likely to pass such legislation. An amendment to the Constitution of the United States conferring
jurisdiction upon the federal government in matters of
divorce is still more unlikely.
CONCLUSION

The migratory divorce problem arose early in our law
when some states took a more liberal view regarding divorce than others. People naturally tried to take advantage of the more liberal laws, and at once the problem
arose as to the validity of these migratory divorces. By
the middle of the last century the views on the subject
had not yet crystalized. The earlier point of view appeared
to be that only the courts of the domicil of the parties
at the time the offence was committed had jurisdiction,
for the reason that the parties were citizens of that state,
which on that account controlled their marriage relationship. It was insisted also that there must be jurisdiction
over the parties. To what extent constructive service was
permissible does not clearly appear. Special stress upon
the necessity of personal jurisdiction over the defendantwas laid in New York.
When our courts began to recognize that for purposes of divorce a married woman could acquire a separate
domicil, the courts were presented with an even more
difficult problem. Ditson v. Ditson "resolved the difficulty
by boldly proclaiming the status theory of divorce, according to which each state in which a spouse is domiciled
has jurisdiction over the entire subject-matter, so as to
be able to divorce its citizens or persons domiciled therein
upon grounds of its own choosing, and if the other party
does not appear, he or she can be brought in by constructive service. When Pennoyer v. Neff" was decided
- 4 R.I. 87 (1856).
I 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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in 1877-the case that laid down the fundamentals of
jurisdiction in our modern law, drawing a distinction between actions in personam and actions in rem, the latter
permitting the defendant to be brought before the court
by constructive service-the question naturally arose of
the classification of divorce suits. The majority of courts
accepted the reasoning of Chief Justice Ames in Ditson
v. Ditson," holding that the res, the status, was in the
state of the domicil of either party,-hence that either
state had the power to terminate the marriage relationship through divorce, and that the defendant, if need be,
could be brought before the court on constructive service."
This was the situation when the first cases came before the Supreme Court in 1901. The question before
the Court was under what circumstances a divorce decree
of a sister state must be recognized by the other states.
The Supreme Court might have taken the view, expressed
by Mr. Justice Black in Williams v. North Carolina II, that
the Constitution and the supporting Act of Congress have
left this matter to the states and that a divorce is valid
whenever it complies with the legislation of the stAte
where it was rendered. The Supreme Court felt, however,
that the power of the respective states regarding the status
of their own citizens was involved and that it was its
duty under the Constitution to be the arbiter. As marriage
is the bulwark of society and its dissolution is of great
concern to the state, what if the states involved have
fundamentally different policies regarding dissolution of
marriage! Should the states having the more conservative attitude be without power to enforce their policies
4 R.I. 87 (1856).
For a critical examination of Pennoyer v. Neff, see Carey, A Suggested Fundamental Basis of Jurisdiction with Special Emphasis on
Judicial Proceedings Affecting Decedents' Estates (1929), 24 Ill. L. Rev.
44, 170. To the effect that considering a divorce proceeding as a proceeding .inrem does not help the solution of the problem, see Williams
v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287, 317, where Mr. Justice Jackson says,
"I doubt that it promotes clarity of thinking to deal with marriage in the
terms of a res, like a piece of land or a chattel. It might be more helpful
to think of marriage as just a marriage-a relationship out of which
spring duties to both spouse and society and from which are derived
rights . . ."
"
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with respect to their own citizens? Should they be obliged to recognize even ex parte divorces with respect to
their own citizens where the plaintiff spouse has gone to
another state for purposes of divorce only and returns
immediately afterwards to his former state, having been
absent perhaps only six weeks or so?
The Supreme Court felt that the state having the
laxest laws should not be allowed to impose its views upon
all sister states and that it should have the power to divorce non-residents only when the plaintiff had become
a local citizen by having established a bona fide domicil
within the state. In the Haddock case the question arose
whether even then such divorce need be recognized with
respect to the other spouse that was not personally before
the divorce court. Its answer in that case was that it need
not be recognized. This doctrine was overruled in the first
Williams case, so that today the recognition of the foreign
divorce depends solely-we are assuming that there was
no personal jurisdiction over the defendant-upon whether
or not the plaintiff had established a bona fide domicil
within the state of divorce. In other words, the view of
the Supreme Court today is, as it has been from the beginning, that the ultimate question involves the rights of
states over their citizens and their status, and not merely
the rights of individuals, and for that reason it is unable
to let go of domicil as the determining factor.
In the nature of things the Supreme Court has insisted that the test of domicil means domicil in the
international or conflict of laws sense and not in the local
sense. If it allowed the question to be determined by the
states in accordance with their own solutions, the state
having the laxest divorce laws would be able to undermine
the policies regarding divorce of all other states. In adjusting the conflicting policies of the individual states,
the Supreme Court has been unwilling to give the predominating power to the state that will go farthest in its
divorce legislation.
As long as we are convinced that the well-being of a
state rests upon the family, we must also admit that the
state should be able to control the status of its citizens
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or domiciliaries, for it is upon the marriage status of its
citizens that the welfare of society rests. When our courts
recognized that a married woman could have a separate
domicil, it became necessary to admit that each state had
jurisdiction over the entire status, so that the state of
divorce, provided the plaintiff had obtained a bona fide
domicil in such state, could change also the status of the
other spouse. Any other conclusion, namely, that where
the parties have different domicils each state can divorce only the party domiciled in the state but not the
other, whose status is controlled by the law of his or her
domicil, would lead to such absurdities as to be inadmissible. For that reason, and to that extent, the policy
of the state of the defendant must yield to the policy of
the divorcing state.
The -above are the fundamental considerations, and
as long as they are kept in view it is difficult to dispense
with domicil as the jurisdictional test.
In order to recognize migratory divorces, we must
abandon all idea that a state has a special interest in
the marital relationship of its citizens or persons domiciled
in the state. If this can be done, there is no difficulty in
holding that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause we
simply have to look to the law of the state of divorce.
Even then the Due Process Clause stares us in the face.
How far can the state of divorce go if the defendant does
not appear? Shall Nevada be allowed to cite the defendant, wwho is domiciled and living in North Carolina, before
its courts by constructive service, if the plaintiff has lived
in Nevada only six weeks, or a single week, or a single
day, or who has not been in the state at all?'" These are
grave questions and they are still unanswered.
11 It would seem clear that a negative answer must be given to all of
these questions.

